

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9934

25 August 1981

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 737



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9934

25 August 1981

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

FOUO No. 737

CONTENTS

BURUNDI

- European Loan Granted for Glassworks
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 17 Jul 81)..... 1

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

- Dacko Said To Be Creating Climate of Civil War
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81)..... 2

- Government's Relations With New French Government Not Yet Clear
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 22 Jul 81)..... 4

- Mitterrand's Election Seen as Encouragement to Real Change
(Leon Leonard N'Dara; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81)..... 7

- Briefs
French Financing Agreements 10
Cattle Breeders Meeting 10

CHAD

- GUNT Said To Be Working To Achieve Nation's Unity
(Mariam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81)..... 11

- New Relations Between French Government, GUNT Possible
(Antonia Blis; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81)..... 15

CONGO

- Briefs
Study of Hydroelectric Complex 17

GUINEA

- Briefs
Cooperation With Belgium Viewed 18

- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MADAGASCAR

Meeting of Joint Commission With USSR Reported (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 24 Jul 81).....	19
CCCE To Finance Sugar Production (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 24 Jul 81).....	20
Briefs Refrigeration Plant	21

MALI

Moussa Traore Looks for New Prime Minister (Sadio Lamine Sow; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 15 Jul 81).....	22
---	----

NIGER

Importance of Kountche's Visit to France Noted (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 10 Jul 81).....	24
Attitude of New French Government Toward Aid to Nation Uncertain (Francoise Hubscher; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 22 Jul 81).....	26
Need for Foreign Assistance During 1981-85 Stressed (Hugues Viel; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 17 Jul 81)..	28
Briefs FRG Cooperation	32

SENEGAL

Economic Relations With FRG Strengthened by Diouf's Visit (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 10 Jul 81).....	33
Briefs Islamic Bank Loans	35

TANZANIA

Briefs Prevalence of Corruption	36
Intensification of Petroleum Exploration	36
Airport Projects	36

ZAIRE

Authorities Take Measures To Eliminate Coffee Fraud (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 17 Jul 81).....	37
--	----

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

-
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Briefs	
Rwandans Lose Citizenship	38
ZAMBIA	
Briefs	
Agricultural Development Bank in Operation	39

- c -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IAL USE ONLY

BURUNDI

EUROPEAN LOAN GRANTED FOR GLASSWORKS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1862, 17 Jul 81 p 1896

[Text] Within the framework of the Second Lome Convention, the European Investment Bank (BEI) has granted a total of 4.2 million ecus (rate of conversion on 31 March 1981, used by the BEI for statistical purposes for the current quarter: 1 ecu = 5.98 French francs or \$1.21 or 109 Burundian francs) for the construction in Burundi of a bottle and jar production unit. This action is the subject of two conditional loans (loans whose repayment, duration and rate may vary depending on the fulfillment of conditions determined at the time they are granted) from risk capital managed by the BEI.

One million ecus were loaned for up to 25 years at a rate of 2 percent to the Republic of Burundi to help it cover a substantial portion of its participation in the capital of the Burundi Glassworks (Verrundi), the promoter of the investments.

Another 3.2 million ecus were granted to the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE) of Burundi, which will participate in the capital of Verrundi (200,000 ecus) and will reloan it 3 million ecus for 20 years at 3.5 percent. This company has among its shareholders the government, European companies and the International Financial Company, which also participates in the financing of the project.

The glassworks will be set up in Bujumbura and will mainly use local hydroelectric power. Its capacity will be on the order of 8,000 tons of bottles and jars a year, to go to the local market and the markets of neighboring countries, Rwanda and eventually eastern Zaire, within the framework of the accords of the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes. The work, whose total cost is an estimated 17 million ecus, should be finished by the second half of 1983. The investment will have a major positive influence on the country's balance of payments and will make it possible to create some 170 jobs.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981.

11,464
CSO: 4719/228

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

DACKO SAID TO BE CREATING CLIMATE OF CIVIL WAR

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 244, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81 pp 27, 28

[Private correspondence from Bangui: "Return to Dictatorship"]

[Text] Rejected by the people, Dacko is trying to create a climate of civil war.

We are presently witnessing a deplorable spectacle in Bangui. This is in effect a dialogue among the deaf which has begun between, on the one hand, the government, made up of the venal men installed by Giscardian France and, on the other hand, the population whose voice is making itself heard especially through the organized opposition that emerged from the election. The latter has just broadened its base with the adhesion of the MDI (Movement for Democracy and Independence) of Francois Gueret, to the CPP (Provisional Political Council), established by the four former competing candidates of David Dacko in the rigged presidential election of 15 March.

Rejected by the Central African people, who in one way or another continue resolutely to demand his departure, Dacko is trying to create a real climate of civil war. He violently attacks the opposition which he accuses of undermining national unity; in his speeches he makes abundant use of openly tribalist and clannish arguments and he has established so-called self-defense committees in the residential sections of the capital. For this purpose, weapons are distributed to the members of his tribe (the Ngbaka) and other militants who are among the "most reliable" members of his party, the UDC (Central African Democratic Union). During a stopover of the Zairian president at Bangui recently, commenting on the problem of the presence of the "Barracuda" force in Central Africa, David Dacko said that "our armed forces were recycled and equipped." But as a matter of fact nothing was done to train the Central African army. Here again, recruiting is based on tribal aspects and national military personnel are assigned only to repression missions. Not only is the democratization process blocked but the constitution adopted in February is being systematically violated and this is again an openly authoritarian regime which soon will be quite like the old regime of Bokassa.

Under these conditions, the five parties within the CPP addressed a joint letter to David Dacko in which, on the basis of specific facts, they protest against the systematic elimination of democratic freedom. "Instead of the social peace whose champion you claimed to be during your election campaign, you have stirred up tribal hatred," emphasized the five signers of the letter. "To impose your antidemocratic 'peace,' you have called upon the formation of private UDC militia units to whom you

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

have given weapons to terrorize the Central African people. Instead of freedom of the press and freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution, you have denied all parties access to radio, with the exception of the UDC all of whose activities are given wide coverage on radio, television, and in the newspaper REALITES CENTRAFRI-CAINES. You furthermore restored the status of the storytellers of Bokassa on radio and television and you have placed them in your service. When you were proclaimed president of all the Central Africans, you undertook to fire all of the Central African high government officials who were not members of the UDC in order to assign positions of responsibility only to the members of that party hereafter. To prevent international public opinion of learning about your violations of the constitution and to give its support to the Central African people, you have established censorship over the dispatches of press agency correspondents. These dispatches must now be reviewed by the minister of post office, telegraph, and telephone." Recalling the decision made by Dacko on 9 May 1981 to postpone the legislative elections indefinitely under the pretext that "social peace has not yet returned," the signers of the protest letter recall that the UGTC (General Union of Central African Workers) was dissolved just a week later under the pretext, this time, that "social peace restored by you had been disturbed by that organization. Right now, the UGTC secretary-general is being tracked down by the forces of law and order on your personal instructions and his life is in danger. To justify his murder in advance, you have started the rumor according to which he is armed, in other words, dangerous, and must be shot. In the past, such measures, far from settling the problems of our country, led to the disaster which we are only too familiar with." In conclusion, the parties signing that document--the FPO-PT, the GIRA, the MDE, the MLPC [Central African People's Liberation Movement], and the PRP, say that they "will not remain inactive" in view of Dacko's determination "to restore dictatorship, fascism, and personal power."

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie

5058
CSO: 4719/200

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS WITH NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT NOT YET CLEAR

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1972, 22 Jul 81 pp 24-25

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Central Africa: Who Is Afraid of the Socialists?"]

[Text] A book published several months ago has been worrying President David Dacko and his friends considerably ever since 10 May. Its title is "Ici et Maintenant" [Here and Now] by Francois Mitterrand. "I did not like," wrote the new French president in particular in connection with the Barracuda operation, "the replacement of compromised ministers by corrupt ministers, since the difference between both of them is only the idea one has in Paris as to their complaisance and their discretion." This is something to worry about when, as in the case of the Central African leaders, one owes one's return to power to French military intervention and the goodwill of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. This undoubtedly also explains why Central African Premier Simon Narcisse Bozanga stayed in Paris between 2 and 11 July; his intention was to persuade the new administration before it was too late.

Bozanga, half in seriousness and half in anxiety, had asked Cooperation Minister Jean-Pierre Cot as well as Guy Penne, the "Mister Africa" at Elysee Palace, the same question: "Do you support an elected government or an opposition?" He was of course gently referring to the barely concealed support given within the "hard-line" wing of the Socialist Party to certain Central African opposition leaders, such as Abel Goumba and (to a lesser degree, Ange Patasse). On Monday, 29 June, 2 days prior to the departure of Simon Bozanga for Paris, the four opposition leaders--Henri Maidou, Francois Pehoua, Ange Patasse, and Abel Goumba--signed a joint announcement "solemnly calling upon the conscience of the French government so that no step would be taken that might consolidate the nature of a regime that has no popular base."

Given on 1 July to a flight attendant on a DC-10 of Air Afrique, carrying Bozanga to Paris, the message was addressed to the top socialist leaders (see the telex by David Dacko, reproduced below). They managed to get the message out in spite of the efforts of the Central African police to intercept it. "Do they want us or do they not?" David Dacko asked himself privately several weeks after the election of Francois Mitterrand.

As a matter of fact, nothing is as yet clear. While there has been an expression of a certain degree of sympathy for the opponents of David Dacko from Lionel Jospin (First Secretary of the Socialist Party) or Veronique Neiertz (who is in charge of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the international sector), others are more restrained, in the name of "realism," such as Foreign Relations Minister Claude Cheysson and Interior Minister Gaston Defferre (who is still very much interested in "African affairs") and for whom Dacko, whether one likes it or not, is "an elected president." Between these two tendencies there are those who are hesitating, such as Jean-Pierre Cot and Guy Penne: Their discussion with Bozanga was "frank and direct." In other words, it was at least not very tense. In the end, Bozanga nevertheless managed to get a short phrase out of the cooperation minister, a phrase which was hardly sympathetic to the Central African opposition: "We cannot make our policy on the basis of tracts."

Menace

But there are many people involved in connection with a Central African situation which is being perceived in France in a very passionate manner: One of Francois Mitterrand's private advisors, Francois de Grossouvre, drafted a document on the subject which will be discussed at the end of July in Elysee Palace during a meeting devoted to Central Africa and there are murmurings to the effect that Defense Minister Charles Hernu has requested from the Bangui broadcasting station of the CERM (Military Intelligence Processing Center) a report on certain officers in the Central African Army. This initiative of course can be interpreted in various ways.

One thing is certain however: The 1,100 paratroopers from Operation Barracuda will remain in Bouar so long as the Chadian situation has not been stabilized. In other words, so long as the Libyans are in N'Djamena. Assurances were given at Bangui to the effect that, at any rate, if Paris had decided to withdraw, "other friendly forces would be ready to take over." Who? "The Moroccans," it was whispered, "with the blessings of Washington." And emphasis was placed on the "menace"--assumed rather than real--coming from opposition leader Idi Lala (the Central African equivalent of the Malian Didi Demba Medina) based at Tripoli, with the intention of overthrowing the Dacko regime.

Rancor

In the meantime, tongues are becoming unloosed in Bangui: Giscardian policy is being criticized with less and less restraint, with a little bit of shame, a dose of opportunism, and some rancor also, including the affairs involving uranium and diamonds (see the interview of Premier Bozanga in JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1071), as well as military affairs; the Barracuda detachment is being accused of not having concerned itself with training the new Central African army. More particularly, there has been a challenge to a French diamond company, a branch of COGEMA [General Nuclear Materials Corporation], called CAREMI (Central African Mining Prospecting) which supposedly exerted "pressures of all kinds" upon the government in Bangui to get the famous "miracle concession" of La Ngoere, exploited by the former Israeli Gen Schmuël Gonen (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1055). Here is an important detail: A member of the Giscard family and former cooperation minister Robert Galley were very much interested in the activities of CAREMI. "They had their friends in the government," confided a minister, "such as the former minister in charge of the economy, Gbakpoma, or the former head of government Jean-Pierre Leboudier." Could it be that the time of disclosures has come? Even so, people are a little bit embarrassed in view of this belated anti-Giscardian frankness.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Alert on Board

We managed to get a copy of the telex sent on 1 July by David Dacko to his Premier Simon Bozanga (who was visiting Paris), announcing the existence of an opposition communique intended to "make trouble" during his stay in France.

The term "WRSCDBWER," which shows up in the first paragraph of this message, is not a typo. It means "a package of tracts." A flight attendant for Air Afrique, who was on the same flight as Simon Bozanga, was charged with disseminating it.

[Text of message]

Central Africa--Paris.

To the attention of His Excellency Simon Narcisse Bozanga, Premier, Head of Government.
NE 8528/81/PR

We are pleased to inform you that your message, announcing your arrival in Paris, was received. Stop. There is nothing special to report now. Stop. However, at the moment of your departure, a flight attendant reportedly received WRSCDBWER made up by the opposition parties to be disseminated in France to make trouble during your stay in Paris. Stop. The attached communique, which I am sending you for your information and for a possible press conference to be held, confirms this eloquently. Stop.

Quote:

Joint Communique

The opposition parties, cosigners of this communique, meeting this day, Monday, 25 June 1981, relating to the reports released over French International Radio, "according to which Mr Simon Narcisse Bozanga, Premier, Central Africa [rest of passage illegible].

2. Solemnly call upon the conscience of the French government so that no step would be taken that might consolidate a regime within [as published; without] real popular base, which would only accentuate the misery of the Central African people.

Done at Bangui, 28 June 1981

Signed:

FPOPT P.R.PM M.L.P.C.

[Central African Peoples Liberation Movement]

A. Goumba B. Maidou A. Patasse

End of Quote

For your consideration, Stop and end.

David Dacko

President of the Central African Republic

Done in Bangui on 1 July 1981.

G.I.R.A.

F. Pehoua

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981

5058

CSO: 4719/200

6

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

MITTERRAND'S ELECTION SEEN AS ENCOURAGEMENT TO REAL CHANGE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 244, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81 p 28

[Article by Leon Leonard N'Dara, Central African intellectual: "Cynicism and Irony"]

[Text] The dispatch of a Central African government delegation to the French government seems to us, the Central African people, to be a combination of cynicism and irony.

As a matter of fact, during the French presidential election campaign, David Dacko on many occasions in certain closed circles tried "to put the whammy" on Francois Mitterrand. In the language of "Central African French," "putting the whammy on somebody" means trying to "block his way," to prevent him from succeeding in an undertaking through curses, that is to say, slander, defamation, conjurations, and imprecations.

While the election campaign was in full swing in France, one could hear, in Bangui, the president of the "Barracudas" of Giscard d'Estaing shout: "Mitterrand? Ha! Ha! Ha! But he is the eternal loser! With Mitterrand, there would be anarchy, incoherence, and instability everywhere. Mitterrand must not get in! In any case, in Central Africa we do not need socialists."

These "evil incantations," proffered by Dacko against the person who was to emerge victorious from the polls on 10 May 1981 in France--something which Bokassa's successor did not dare assume--were carried on Central African radio and even television. The Central African media--to the extent that one can speak of media since they are rather slim--systematically mobilized, in terms of zeal, rivaled those in the anti-Mitterrand campaign. The only candidate worthy of the French presidency was Giscard, "Giscard, the African; Giscard, the Central African!" And with good reason: Without Valery Giscard d'Estaing and his "Barracuda" operation, David Dacko would never have been returned to the position of president in Bangui in September 1979, nor would he have been confirmed in his job which he grabbed during the rigged elections in March 1981.

"When you keep running against a closed door," wrote Sartre, "there comes a moment when you are going to break it." On 10 May, in the evening, when, around 2000 or 2100, the victory of Francois Mitterrand appeared practically certain, general joy broke out in the low-income sections of Bangui. On that evening, Dacko for a moment wanted to go into action against those people in Myskine, Boy-Rabe, Gobongo, and Fou.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

He summoned his general staff to issue an order to send out "his armed forces" against those residential areas and to impose silence. At that moment he realized that there were no longer any "armed forces capable of crushing" those people. But at least he had the "Barracudas." They however could not budge. Only then did Dacko realize the cruel disaster he faced: Power had just passed from the hands of his "cousin" and protector Giscard to the hands of his "anti-cousin" Mitterrand.

The shock was even worse since David Dacko had always been more or less aware of the precariousness of his power. On many occasions he did not fail to remark to some of his close associates that he was in reality only a hostage, closely guarded so long as he was being watched by the "Barracudas," that he was nothing but a simple pawn, subjected to the will of Giscard.

But, without the slightest sense of shame, Dacko quickly sent a message of congratulations to Francois Mitterrand; then he sent private and secret emissaries to Paris to test the waters, along with an official delegation headed by Bozanga, his head of government, who is only his carbon copy.

During that week at the end of June and the beginning of July, when that delegation was "promenading" in Paris, we, the Central Africans in Bangui and in the provinces, as well as all of our fellow citizens who had been forced into exile, held our breath. In the name of whom and what was Bozanga going to France? Did we not realize that Dacko and his government are not at all the result of the desire of the Central African people whose aspirations they are incapable of expressing?

After 20 years of dictatorship, what the Central African people need first of all is to restore the home, the family, the family group, and all society without any regionalist, tribal, or clan discrimination. Our physical, moral, and social health is under attack; our economy is confiscated and moribund; our resources dwindle daily.

The French people have chosen a new left-wing majority after realizing that they had been fooled, exploited, and despised. We likewise do not wish to be fooled, exploited, and disdained any longer by the "pawns" put in place by Giscard d'Estaing, men such as Dacko, Bozanga, and their clique.

With those "pawns" at the head of Central African State, we would always have the rule of moral and spiritual degradation, of tribal and clan discrimination, the rule of the economy of plunder, of servitude, and misery, of political incoherence, the rule of violence and humiliation.

With those "pawns" in power at Bangui, we can be sure of one thing: That any aid coming from abroad would always be diverted for their purposes and would only serve for the satisfaction of the unlimited appetites of those bloodsuckers and executioners of the Central African people.

The latter are ready to roll up their sleeves to build their country. But that can be done only on one condition: That the team of "cousins" of Giscard, imposed upon Bangui by force and manipulation, yield to a new team, the team which will be chosen by the Central African people itself thanks to a broad national consensus.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The election of Francois Mitterrand to the position of chief executive of the French state was received among us not only with tremendous hope but also as a form of encouragement: Encouragement for likewise promoting a real change in Central Africa which today is still a real French colony. If the new France--which, because it inherited the burden of Giscardian policy in Bangui, must also take positive steps --helps us in that, then we will not disappoint it!

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie

5058

CS0: 4719/200

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

FRENCH FINANCING AGREEMENTS--France and the Central African Republic signed on 30 June, in Bangui, two financing agreements for a total of 140 million CFA francs (or 2.8 million French francs). The first agreement (for 125 million CFA francs) concerns the electric energy sector. It is an emergency plan to ensure the protection and normal operation of the Central African National Power Company (ENERCA). The second agreement (for 15 million CFA francs) concerns the study and building of slip ways in the Kolongo shipyards on the Oubangui River outside Bangui. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul 81 p 1833] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

CATTLE BREEDERS MEETING--President Dacko attended on 1 July, in Bangui, the opening session of the Eighth Annual General Meeting of the National Association of Central African Cattle Breeders (ANEC). In his speech, the head of state asked cattle breeders to take care of their own health and of the health of their cattle to increase livestock production in Central Africa. Among the main factors which prevent better cattle breeding conditions in the Central African Republic, David Dacko mentioned, in particular, the traditional clashes between cattlemen and farmers and the "clandestine activities of some cattlemen who are guided by considerations of personal interest." He recommended the creation of schools for the children of cattlemen. The ANEC General Meeting studied the demarcation of areas assigned to livestock, the definition of regulations to curb the theft and slaughter of animals and the creation of new communities in areas assigned to cattle breeding. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1861, 10 Jul 81 p 1833] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

CSO: 4719/188

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

GUNT SAID TO BE WORKING TO ACHIEVE NATION'S UNITY

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 244, 20 Jul - 2 Aug 81 pp 24-25, 26

[Article by Mariam Sysle: "The FROLINAT Key"]

[Text] In less than a year, the congress of a reunified movement is to meet, this time relieved of the demons of division.

The key explaining the development observed on the level of Pan-African organization can be found in Chad. While Hissein Habre lost face, the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government], directed by Goukouni Oueddei, baffled the most alarmist predictions. Without noise, without any spectacular announcement, the team in position in N'Djamena and the militants following the FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front] faced the attacks. An in-depth job had been accomplished, dominated by just one concern: to preserve the cohesion of the GUNT, to push national unification and thoroughly to destroy the factors of division which, along with foreign interference and maneuvers--those of France first of all--had led the country to the edge of disaster and collapse.

During the long trip made to the south and east of the country by the GUNT president, it was possible to observe the profound aspiration for peace and national unity among the people, as well as the sincerity of the proclaimed desire of Goukouni Oueddei to lead his country on the road of independence and a real resurrection.

After that, the cadre seminar only confirmed the current determination to find a national and democratic solution to the country's drama. The announcement, last May, of the establishment of an integrated national army showed that there was an intention to move on from promises to action; command of that army was given to Lieutenant Colonel Allafi; the army was to be made up of the best fighting men from the old political-military factions as well as the most seasoned soldiers of the former government forces (FAT [Chadian Armed Forces]).

But it was undoubtedly the efforts made to reunify, on a solid political basis, the former tendencies which subscribed to the objectives and the struggle of FROLINAT--a process which today, it seems, has reached a point of no return--that constituted the element marking the evolution of the situation since the liberation of N'Djamena last December.

The problem of unifying the political-military tendencies that subscribed to FROLINAT had come up as a vital necessity after the Lagos agreements of August 1979. However,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the conversations--which were well along the way since they had led to the drafting of documents--were abruptly interrupted in March 1980 by the coup mounted by Hissein Habre, which resulted in another 9 months of war.

Critical Review

The process was revived right after the liberation of N'Djamena on 13 January in the course of a meeting attended not only by chief of state Goukouni Oueddei but also by the leaders of the four tendencies within FROLINAT represented within the GUNT, such as it had emerged from the torment of the last conflict: Mahamat Abba Seid, interior minister and leader of the First Army; Acyl Ahmat Agabach, minister of foreign affairs and chairman of the CDR (Democratic Council of the Revolution); Mahamat Moussa Medela, minister of public health and commander of the FAO (Western Armed Forces); as well as Mahamat Issa Idriss, chairman of the revolutionary council of the FAP (People's Armed Forces).

A technical commission, a so-called "Commission of the Four," was established; its job was to pick up things where they had been left, almost a year earlier, at the moment when the FAN (Northern Armed Forces) were still included among the tendencies that had emerged from FROLINAT. An initial outline of the political map combined the program of the old UNT (National Chadian Union), of which Ibrahim Abatcha (one of the creators of FROLINAT) was one of the founders in 1957, and the initial eight-point program of FROLINAT. Since then, efforts aimed at completing the reunification process on new bases could not be allowed to flag. There was a succession of discussions and meetings. While the outlines of the future reunified FROLINAT took shape, several decisions, having repercussions on the national level, were made. On 5 February, the project for the rally of the military forces of the various tendencies within FROLINAT was dropped to the benefit of the creation of an integrated national army. It became increasingly indispensable and urgent to rally, on a united political base, the forces that subscribed to the revolution. "We gave priority to the integration of all military forces of the GUNT within a unified national army," President Goukouni Oueddei emphasized on that score. "But the training of that national army would have no meaning if the political tendencies were to continue to exist, with their sterile contradictions. Likewise, the reunification of the tendencies of FROLINAT on the political level is a first necessary step toward total national unity."

On 1 March (the anniversary of the creation of FROLINAT of Ibrahima Abatcha), a new phase was completed with the establishment of a CRF (Committee for the Reunification of FROLINAT), comprising 12 members and presided over by Issa Abdallah. It was furthermore decided to launch a vast indoctrination campaign aimed at all authorities and organizational components of FROLINAT in order "to implant the deep roots of the concepts of unity" and, on the other hand, to create a special commission charged with contacting the FAT and the government employees with a view to working out a "mixed and clear program for national unity."

At the end of many debates, in which the leaders and rank-and-file members of all of the old tendencies of FROLINAT participated, a series of documents was adopted, including a political program, a revolutionary action charter, and new statutes for the reunified Front. The vast work of fusion continued pending the convening of a

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

general congress which was to be held in less than a year and which was to mark the rebirth, on new bases taking into account past experience, the priorities and urgencies of the moment, concerning a reunified FROLINAT, once and for all relieved of the "demons" of division.

In the preamble of a document describing the various phases marking the current process of reunification, the CRF, after briefly recalling the conditions under which Chad became independent and touching upon the birth of the armed struggle, emphasized the following last April: "We would not be sincere if we did not admit that the military victories of FROLINAT against imperialism and its agents are tarnished by a relative political setback in the sense that the revolutionary movement plunged head-first into the favorite trap of imperialism which consists of dividing and conquering. As a matter of fact, in contradiction to the national unity program prepared by its founder, FROLINAT appeared as a representative of the country's northern half; its ranks broke up into several 'mini-FROLINAT' units lined up against each other, each proposing only a legally carefully prepared case against its rivals in the form of a specific political program. What more eloquent proof could there be of the danger coming from the inability of FROLINAT to rally the Chadian nation, from north to south, from east to west, including Muslims and Christians, than the intense maneuvers promoted by French imperialism in an attempt to divide Chad through its local puppet, Hissein Habre, and certain Arab and African regimes?"

Future Identity

Emphasizing that "the question of national unity and the preservation of the Chadian state as an autonomous entity today constitute the most vital task of the moment," the CRF document continues: "The persistence of unprincipled divisions within FROLINAT were not only a handicap to the achievement of national unity but also represented a terrible delayed-action bomb which was capable, from one minute to the next, to blast the precious national gains resulting from the patriotic fight against the FAN and wiping out what still is left of our Chad. Likewise we must not doubt for a single instant the fact that the achievement of national unity and the consolidation of peace and stability necessarily involve the immediate launching of efforts to reunify FROLINAT on solid foundations."

Under these conditions we understand that the main concern was to build "a solid foundation so that unity would be more than just a simple juxtaposition of scattered and divergent forces and so that the organization would not appear as some kind of marriage between competing personal ambitions or a rearrangement between tiny little groups with long teeth."

In conclusion, the CRF document emphasized that the reunification of FROLINAT would certainly not mean "the end of all problems. On the contrary, it will mark the end of the period of superfluous problems, springing from regional subjectivism and struggles among interest groups and it will mark the beginning of the period of essential problems, such as the choice of a constitutional model suitable for Chad, the type of regional administration responding to the country's social configuration, agricultural, industrial, monetary, and educational strategy, etc., for the reconstruction of the state and its development. It is likewise necessary to spell out the future identity of FROLINAT itself (is it to be one party among others, a consultative body, or something else?)."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In any case, the analysis effort, both critical and constructive, has already been made and it makes us think that the Chadian patriots will know how to find the means of mastering their painful experiences in order to fructify the gains of 15 years of tremendous sacrifices and courageous struggles.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie

5058

CSO: 4719/200

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN FRENCH GOVERNMENT, GUNT POSSIBLE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 244, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81 p 26

[Article by Antonia Blis: "Hope, At Last"]

[Text] The new approach which emerged at Nairobi will undoubtedly restore the Chadian economic situation.

The hope of seeing Chad at last putting an end to the dramatic and destructive troubles featuring a close interconnection of fratricidal wars and foreign interference, was never as great nor as well justified as it is today. The obstacles to the process of peace and normalization currently in progress and to the emergence of a new nation, reunified and totally sovereign, undoubtedly have not yet been fully removed. While the confusion maintained for so long and so deliberately regarding the Chadian problem is in the process of disappearing, some people obstinately insist on engaging in a rather doubtful rear-guard action. On the Sudanese border, in the northeastern part of the country, the forces of Hissein Habre reequipped by Cairo and Khartoum--but for how much longer?--have not abandoned their undertaking of harassing the government in power to implement their designs and they are now looking to the Reagan administration whose statements make one think that Washington might be tempted to take the place of old Giscardian France by playing the role of western imperialism's policeman in that part of the world.

However--and this for the time being is the essential point--the last summit of the OAU has just come up with an infinitely more realistic and more sound estimate of the situation in Chad. It suffices to recall the fallacious arguments advanced not so long ago to measure the importance of the progress which has been made. Today it is no longer a question--as it had been for example in January, at the Lome summit, along the lines drawn by the Giscard d'Estaing administration--of attempting to impose unrealistic dictates upon the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government], nor of wiping out with one stroke of the pen 9 months of war under the pretext of sticking to the August 1979 Lagos agreements, as if nothing had happened since then.

The new situation created by the last test undergone by Chad was taken up in June at Nairobi and a more just measure was taken regarding the real meaning of Libyan aid and presence. The voices and the aspirations of the Chadians were heard and they were at last implicitly granted the right to decision and self-determination, expressing confidence in their patriotism and maturity. The support for the GUNT,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

as expressed by the OAU, in the Nairobi resolution, was thus supposed to signify the end of pressures and delaying maneuvers which had tended to trap the team in N'Djamena in a precarious situation of isolation and permanent "alert." Moreover, in calling upon the member states to support the GUNT in its efforts to maintain peace and security in the country and refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of Chad, the OAU posed the problem in its real dimensions and considered the order of priorities involved. Thus it is no longer a question of denying the threats that still hang over the country; on the contrary, the important thing is to neutralize those who would like to revive the war. And if everybody agrees--starting with N'Djamena and Tripoli--as to the need for withdrawing the Libyan troops that came to help the GUNT to put an end to the rebellion of Hissein Habre, then one can agree that this problem cannot be separated from the return of Chad to normalcy and the strengthening of the defensive capacity of the GUNT.

This is the meaning of the resolution adopted at Nairobi, announcing the decision of the OAU summit "to make the financial and material resources available to the GUNT" so that the latter might "guarantee the rapid formation of the integrated national army and the progressive replacement of foreign troops stationed on national territory." While the possibility of the dispatch of a Pan-African force to N'Djamena remains on the agenda--in spite of the difficulties encountered in practical terms here for the past 2 years--it is said that it is up to the OAU to explore all means necessary, including an approach to the UN to permit its financing. But it is understood that nothing will be done without prior consultation of the GUNT--especially regarding the makeup of the neutral force. Finally, the Nairobi decisions express the awareness of the fact that the normalization of the situation in Chad--and consequently the stability of the region--necessitate a general contribution to the vital tasks of rebuilding the country.

Support

Breaking with the situation of tacit blockade established around N'Djamena under the influence of the former Giscardian administration, the OAU summit called upon all member states, as well as the UN and international organizations to come to the aid of the GUNT to restore the administrative structures and to rebuilt the economy devastated by 15 years of conflict and war. In this context the UN secretary-general was asked to hold a conference to announce aid contributions to Chad.

It goes without saying that the new approach which was launched at Nairobi should not fail to restore the Chadian economic situation or to speed up the process of peace, national reunification, and rebirth in progress at N'Djamena. The OAU decisions have already had favorable repercussions in Paris where it is expected that the new left-wing government will break with the policy pursued by its predecessor. Commenting on the resolution on Chad adopted by the Nairobi summit, French Foreign Relations Minister Claude Cheysson expressed France's desire to make a contribution to its implementation.

This is an opening which is bound to be followed by specific effects when one realizes that N'Djamena--which dispatched its foreign affairs minister to contact the new French authorities--has constantly expressed its desire for the establishment of new relationships of cooperation and mutual aid between the two countries.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie

16

5058

CSO: 4719/200

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONGO

BRIEFS

STUDY OF HYDROELECTRIC COMPLEX--The People's Republic of the Congo has commissioned the Geneva-based Universal Engineering and Finance Corporation (UNEFICO) to conduct detailed studies and do some preliminary work for a 100-megawatt hydroelectric complex located about 150 kilometers from Brazzaville on the Lefini River. The complex, which consists of a dam, a power station and a transmission line, will be capable of supplying electricity to the Congolese capital and the Plateaux region by the second half of the current decade. The actual studies will be done by the Basel-based firm Universal Ingenieurs-Counsel SA, a partner company of UNEFICO. The access road and some drilling operations have already been started by local enterprises. UNEFICO and Universal Ingenieurs-Conseil SA are subsidiaries of the Swiss Banking Company. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul p 1835] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

CSO: 4719/188

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GUINEA

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH BELGIUM VIEWED--Guinean Minister of Mines and Geology Ismael Toure visited Belgium from 22 to 26 June 1981. He toured the region of Wallonia at the invitation of the Walloon regional administrator. The two parties studied the possibility of launching a renewed bilateral cooperation. A consortium has been established to promote Guinea-Belgium relations in the economic and technological fields. The Walloon region will participate in this consortium. Among the cooperation projects contemplated is the Mifergui-Nimba related to the exploitation of the Mount Nimba iron deposits. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Jul 81 p 1939]

CSO: 4719/277

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MADAGASCAR

MEETING OF JOINT COMMISSION WITH USSR REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1863, 24 Jul 81 p 1953

/Text/ The second meeting of the Soviet-Malagasy joint commission is being held 24 July at Antananarivo, and preparatory work was begun on 17 July by a Soviet delegation led by Mr Moskalef, deputy director of the department of economic cooperation in the USSR state committee for external relations, and a Malagasy delegation led by Paul Rakotondramasy, director of bilateral relations in the Malagasy ministry of foreign affairs. Among the items on the agenda for the joint commission is Soviet-Malagasy cooperation involving some 2,630 million Malagasy francs, payback of the Soviet loan being scheduled to start in 1985.

We recall that the first meeting of the Soviet-Malagasy joint commission was held in August 1980, and its conclusions have since been implemented in the field, particularly by the completion of a 2 x 75 kW medium-wave station at Imerintsiatosika, the extraction of gold from the Mananjary and Fianarantsoa regions, and the construction of the Antsirabe pilot agricultural stations.

Also noted a year ago was the visit of the Soviet agriculture minister, which made possible an on-site inspection of the project to improve the milk-cows at Antsirabe and the finished Mandrare dam project as well as the irrigation channels in the surrounding lowlands.

In the cultural domain, the USSR in 1981 provided Madagascar with 231 study scholarships; about a hundred Soviet teachers will be coming to Madagascar. Also, the USSR has made a gift of laboratory equipment to the university centers.

We should add that a delegation from the Soviet cultural ministry arrived on 16 July in Antananarivo and was to have talks with Malagasy officials.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.

9516
CSO: 4719/244

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MADAGASCAR

CCCE TO FINANCE SUGAR PRODUCTION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1863, 24 Jul 81 p 1953

[Text] Rakotovao-Razakaboana, the Malagasy minister of finances and planning, and Manuel Bridier, director of the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) in Madagascar, signed on 16 July in Antananarivo an agreement by which the CCCE is to provide Madagascar with a loan of Fr 29 million, or 1,450 million Malagasy francs, to be used for financing an emergency program in the sugar sector.

This emergency program covers the renovation of equipment and restoration of supplies of spare parts and basic equipment for the sugar complexes of SIRAMA [Malagasy Sugar Company] (Ambilobe and Namakia) and SNBCE [expansion unknown] (Nosy-Be and Brickaville). The loan will bear interest at 7 percent per year. The reimbursement period is 15 years, including a 5-year grace period. All the funds are to be disbursed by 30 June 1982.

The borrower, which is the state, will re-lend the proceeds of the loan: 1,165 million Malagasy francs to SIRAMA and 285 million to SNBCE. The conditions to be placed on these subsidiary loans will be specified in the corresponding conventions to be signed by the state and each of the two companies.

It should be noted, still on the subject of the sugar sector, that CCCE is presently studying the possibility of contributing to the financing of the agricultural part of the Analaiwa sugar complex. In that connection, its supervisory council has already decided to allot a Fr 3.9 million (195 million Malagasy francs) for the study of a detailed rough draft as well as for assistance to and organization of the tree-nursery.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.

9516
CSO: 4719/244

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

REFRIGERATION PLANT--A refrigeration plant with a 1,000 cubic meter capacity belonging to SICE (Industrial and Commercial Company of Emyrne, a state-owned company) was opened at the end of June in Toamasina. This plant, which represents an investment of 130 million Malagasy francs, includes one storage chamber of 450 cubic meters, another of 350 cubic meters, and an airlock of 200 cubic meters. It will serve to house perishable goods such as butter, meat, and fish...for local consumption or export. Text Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1863, 24 Jul 81 p 1953 COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981 9516

CSO: 4719/244

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MALI

MOUSSA TRAORE LOOKS FOR NEW PRIME MINISTER

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1071, 15 Jul 81 pp 56-57

[Article by Sadio Lamine Sow]

[Text] President Moussa Traore is looking for a prime minister. The special congress of the UDPM (Democratic Union of Malian People), of which he is the secretary general, offered him this possibility in February 1981 (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1052). The creation of that post is supposed to improve the situation of the single party established with difficulty in March 1978.

The new institutions only worked on paper because the militants did not respond with the mobilization desired in the high echelons. To analyze these shortcomings, the BEC (Central Executive Bureau), the highest authority on Mali, started holding meetings which revealed an even more serious problem--distrust for the political power itself.

Then in March 1980, confronted with the most serious student crisis, the party leadership turned to repression instead of dialogue: the schools were closed, many students were expelled, and trade unionists were sentenced, not to mention the death of student leader Abdoul Karim Camara, known as Cabral, as a result of being tortured.

Col Sekou Ly, minister of national education, admitted in a radio broadcast that the crisis accurately reflected a political problem. A social volcano is brewing under the students' agitation and could still explode. To prevent this explosion, the special congress decided to reelect the party officials while giving overwhelming support to its secretary general, Moussa Traore, whose mandate has been extended.

Forced to take in hand a shaky party under catastrophic circumstances (Mali will soon be back with the CFA franc abandoned 19 years ago), by appointing a prime minister Gen Moussa Traore should be able to set aside some of his government duties since he holds the posts of head of state, president of the republic, president of the government, secretary general of the party and minister of defense.

The future appointment of a number two man in the government will take place after the election of the new Central Executive Bureau and the dissolution of the National Assembly in November 1981, as scheduled (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1064). But the president will not be faced with an easy choice. Whether he is a civilian or a military man, the prime minister must be a wise manager without being a technocrat blind to the sensitivities of this proud nation.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

He will have to show determination while being flexible enough to gain support for the government. He must be a man with experience in international relations but cannot be an unknown in the domestic arena. In a nutshell, he must inspire confidence among Mali's partners who are worried over the economic situation (expected return to membership in the UMOA [West African Monetary Union]) and over the political situation (danger of destabilization), and above all he must be credible enough to show that the head of state is determined to carry out the promised changes.

Where can this heaven-sent man be found? Four names are being mentioned in Bamako. Almamy Sylla, deputy director of FAO in Rome (Italy) is one name. He met with President Traore early this year. He knows Western business circles but has not lived in Mali for the last 20 years. He is said to have refused to accept the president's offer.

There is also Mamadou Aw who stands a good chance on the basis of his ministerial career which started under the government of the short-lived Federation of Mali (1960) and of his service as high commissioner of the OMSV (Senegal River Development Organization). He has put forward conditions which cannot be met.

Another name mentioned is Thieoule Konate, son of the deceased Mamadou Konate, co-founder of the African Democratic Rally. He is a former minister under the military regime who left the government as a result of disagreements with the then minister of interior, Kissima Doukara, but enjoys the prestige attached to his family. Would he accept this "high risk" position when, according to some sources, he is not on the best of terms with the president?

Finally, there is Mady Diallo, current minister for cattle raising, water and forests, who joined the government 2 years ago as minister of finance and commerce. He served as ambassador to France from 1969 to 1977 and organized the only official visit ever made by a Malian president to the former colonial country.

Gen Moussa Traore who is trying to form a coalition with the USRDA [Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally] (the party of President Modibo Keita who died in prison in 1977), seeks the support of President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast 2 months ago. The latter arranged for him to meet, in the Ivory Coast, with Mahamane Allassane Haidara, former president of the National Assembly whom the USRDA leaders see as the "recognized successor" of Modibo Keita. Whatever he does, Moussa Traore will have to make up his mind soon.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.

8796
CSO: 4719/190

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGER

IMPORTANCE OF KOUNTCHE'S VISIT TO FRANCE NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul 81 p 1827

[Text] The current private visit to France by the head of state of Niger, Col Sen Seyni Kountche, is of great importance for Niger, which is going through an economic crisis and whose development depends to a great extent on the policy which the new French Government will adopt in the sphere of energy.

President Kountche will meet Francois Mitterrand, the head of state, for the first time on Friday, 10 July. The talks between the two presidents will cover three subjects: uranium, development aid and foreign policy. The most important of these topics is, undoubtedly, the uranium issue. Niger has based its development policy on its earnings from the sale of uranium which provides every year the total of its investments funds. Furthermore, very large amounts of capital, both Nigerien and French, have been invested in the mining industry and in its infrastructure.

Since France is that country's major client, France's future energy and nuclear policy is very important for Niger in the short term--from the viewpoint of its impact on the budget--and in the long term for the future of the country's mining industry.

Over the last 12 months, [French Prime Minister] Barre's former government had come to the assistance of the Nigerien economy which was severely affected by the slump of international prices for uranium, by accepting a price above the average international price, making additional purchases of uranium and granting exceptional aid in the form of 80 million French francs worth of loans.

Although in the sphere of general cooperation the new French Government has already made statements which are reassuring for the Third World, President Kountche will probably try to seek confirmation of the French commitments regarding the project of the Kandadji dam on the Niger River.

This dam, with an estimated cost of over 100 billion CFA francs, is the cornerstone of Niger's development. It will provide electricity for the entire western part of the country and will irrigate some 140,000 hectares of land thus making Niger capable of feeding itself and cutting down its oil bill.

The Kandadji project, opposed by several financial backers, particularly the FRG and the Arab oil countries, has found only one champion: the French Government where Robert Galley, then minister for cooperation, made a personal pledge to find the capital required.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

President Kountche's visit to Paris will also coincide with a meeting of the project's financial backers who, in principle, are supposed to come to a decision on that subject.

In the sphere of foreign policy, the statements made by the French president and by his minister of foreign affairs, Claude Cheysson, have defined perfectly well the African policy of the Mauroy Government.

While the Government of Niger has always clearly expressed its views on the major foreign policy issues--Namibia, South Africa, Palestine--, it has shown greater discretion and subtlety concerning the more immediate regional problems. In fact, President Kountche did not condemn Libyan troops intervention in Chad or the role played by Col Qadhdhafi in central and western Africa, until the Libyan leader's policy had repercussions inside Niger.

The talks between Mitterrand and Kountche will, therefore, be a review of regional questions and an assessment of Col Qadhdhafi's new policy, a more conciliatory and moderate policy than in the past.

But according to political observers, the climate that will prevail at this first meeting between the head of state of Niger and the French president will depend mostly on the French reaction to the economic problems of Niger.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.

8796
CSO: 4719/188

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGER

ATTITUDE OF NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT TOWARD AID TO NATION UNCERTAIN

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1072, 22 Jul 81 pp 22, 23

[Article by Francoise Hubscher: "Niger--Cooperation Irradiated by Uranium"]

[Text] "The intentions are good. I did not say that they are different. They are good, that is all." This remark comes from one of the high Nigerien officials who accompanied President Seyni Kountche during his trip to Paris (7-11 July). It expresses, at once, the real hope which the Nigerien chief of state entertained right after his first meeting with French President Francois Mitterrand but also his desire to judge the situation in the light of the facts. A first-hand look is absolutely necessary.

During his term of office as president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing had not failed to assert that France would aid Niger, one of the poorest countries of the world, in developing its economy while completely respecting the desire for independence and dignity of its people. The facts were not always up to these good intentions. This was especially true during the last quarter of 1980 during the annual negotiations on the uranium price which by itself accounts for three-quarters of Niger's exports.

Seyni Kountche had wanted, in spite of the temporary drop of world prices on the free market (35 percent in one year), placing uranium metal at a price of 16,000 F CFA [Francs of the African community], to get a reasonable price, that is, 23,000 F CFA. The French government had promised him that it would support his demand in dealing with the enterprises involved in the operation of the mines, primarily COGEMA [General Nuclear Materials Company], which is one of the big French government companies. In vain. He had to accept a price of 20,000 F CFA per kilogram. At least the Nigeriens were hoping that France would not hesitate to subsidize one half of the 8 billion F CFA which they needed to balance their 1981 budget. Instead of subsidies, there were only loans.

Discreet during negotiations on uranium prices, the personal influence of Valery Giscard d'Estaing carried no less weight when it came, for example, to oppose the appointment of the former minister of economic affairs, Mai Maigana, to head the SMTT (Mining Company of Tassa N'Taghalgue) which will start operating a new mine in 1983. Early in 1981, Mai Maigana was appointed president of another uranium company, COMINAK, which, established in 1978, had at last gotten off the ground.

Seyni Kountche thus came to see Francois Mitterrand among other things with the intention of asking him to have the French government concern itself less with the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

internal activities of the mining companies of Niger and concentrate more on objectives which he had included in the context of the proper kind of cooperation. Was he understood? It seems he was.

Very favorably impressed by Cooperation and Development Minister Jean-Pierre Cot, who efficiently supports Jean Audibert, he found, not without real pleasure, that the image of the system of Niger, although not socialist, was excellent in the eyes of his new conversation partner. Jean-Pierre Cot, just like Francois Mitterrand and his Foreign Relations Minister Claude Cheysson, declared himself very much aware of the tough effort characterizing the management of the Nigerien economy.

There were suggestions which create a certain impression of vagueness in the Ministry of Industry where they obviously had hardly any time to take up the Niger issue. There were proposals which were all the more promising since the Nigerians hope to be among the first beneficiaries of the doubling of aid to the Third World announced by the French socialists.

There were suggestions which in any case will rapidly be put to the test. Negotiations on the uranium price for 1982 will begin in October. There is no doubt that President Kountche will demand a major increase in the price even though he maintains tight silence on that issue right now. Certain facts in the current situation encourage him: The presence, at the head of the United States, of Ronald Reagan, a supporter of the idea of resuming the American nuclear program; the rise in the dollar, a currency which expresses the reference rates as well as certain signs of recovery on the market.

What will be the attitude of the French socialist administration which does not have the intention to maintain the entire nuclear program of its predecessors? Will the men of the former president remain in place? Especially his first cousin Jacques Giscard d'Estaing who is currently the administrator of COGEMA and president of one of the mining companies of Niger, SOMAIR [Air Region Mining Company];

Here is the second test: The Kandaji dam, the biggest project of Niger (100 billion F CFA for the dam alone) intended to irrigate 140,000 hectares. The Nigeriens hope that France, along with other partners, will display more energy than before in order to overcome the persistent reluctance of the Germans, before the next meeting of lenders at Niamey (first quarter of 1982).

"The intentions are good." Yes, but facts speak louder than words.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA, 1981

5058
CSO: 5719/200

NIGER

NEED FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE DURING 1981-85 STRESSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1862, 17 Jul 81 pp 1860-1862

[Article by Hugues Viel]

[Text] Speaking before the Eurafrikan Press Association on 2 July, Andre Lewin, director of the Ministry of Foreign Relations Department of United Nations and International Organizations, reported on plans for the UN Conference on the Least Advanced Countries (PMA), which will open at the UNESCO Headquarters in Paris on 1 September, presided over by Francois Mitterrand. Some 20 chiefs of state, including the current president of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, will attend the conference, which will be attended by some 3,500 delegates from countries belonging to the United Nations and the major international organizations.

Each of the least advanced countries has prepared a report on its economic situation and the projects it hopes to have financed by the industrialized countries, including those with a planned central economy (socialist bloc of East Europe) and the oil-producing nations with a surplus balance of payments, as we explained in our issue of 26 June (page 1693). Based on these reports, in seven successive issues of MARCHES TROPICAUX, we shall present each of the 21 least advanced countries of Africa, beginning this week with Guinea and Niger. The analyses were made by Hugues Viel, in charge of economic studies for MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS.

Niger: Development or Stagnation?

Unlike other countries, one cannot say that from the very beginning, Niger had many assets to help it emerge from chronic underdevelopment. A mere examination of the map is significant. When to its landlocked nature and the rigors of a semi-desert climate, except on the southern fringe, one adds the damage of 5 years of a persistent drought (1969 to 1973), one can understand how much this almost essentially rural country has suffered. And yet, in 1971, the startup of uranium mining in the Arlit region gave leaders reasonable hope of obtaining satisfactory and promising development. From 1,306 tons of uranium metal in 1975, production rose to 4,180 tons in 1980, meaning a comfortable foreign exchange income enabling Nigeriens to invest thanks to their own resources. However, since 1980, world uranium prices have been clearly down and this situation may well last until 1985.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The economic takeoff glimpsed for a time therefore seems to be postponed. Within the framework of the Conference on the Least Advanced Countries, a program for Niger's development from 1981 to 1990 has been drawn up. Let us examine it and see to what extent the decisions that will be made can help the country to better master its development.

Nigerien Economy

Over the past 5 years, growth has been strong. The GNP (gross national product) rose an average of 8.6 percent a year from 1975 to 1980, mainly due to a clear increase in the production of the rural sector and also to the increase in uranium production. There was also an increase in public investments financed by the National Investment Fund and loans contracted for abroad.

However, financially speaking, the government's ability to finance development projects is closely linked to the fluctuations in foreign exchange receipts from uranium. These receipts have dropped substantially, as prices have dropped, which makes it necessary to have aid to maintain investments and thereby increase the foreign debt. That debt, which totaled 105 billion CFA francs at the end of 1979, went up an additional 60 billion in 1980 and the service on the debt amounted to nearly 8.7 billion in 1980-1981. As for the trade balance, it should show a deficit for another 5 years. Uranium, livestock and a few industrial crops (cotton, peanuts) do not compensate in value for imports of consumer goods, equipment and oil products.

Objectives for 1981-1990 Decade

Achieving food independence and establishing an independent, autonomous economy: These are the essential objectives for the 1981-1990 period. The growth in the economy during that decade has been evaluated as follows: The GNP should increase by 4.2 percent annually during the 1981-1985 period. During the second period, annual growth should be on the order of 5.9 percent and the GNP should reach 870 billion CFA francs between now and 1990 (535 billion in 1981). But these rates were calculated based on several assumptions: normal climatic conditions during the 1981-1985 period; a uranium price at least following the rate of inflation; continuation of investments in the mining industry; and the observation of a certain budgetary austerity.

Growth programs have been drawn up by sector and it is interesting to examine them one after the other.

1) Agriculture: Along with livestock raising, lumbering and fishing, it makes up 43.9 percent of the GNP. Some 90 percent of the rural population (total of 5.1 million inhabitants) lives in rural communities.

Food crops occupy some 3.3 million hectares out of the 15 million hectares of arable land: one-fifth. In recent years, production of the main crops has steadily grown, but productivity will still have to improve if one wants to meet the food needs of the population and earn foreign exchange through exports. The area of irrigated land must be increased by 1,000 hectares a year. Plans for 1990 are as follows:

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Millet and sorghum, 2.18 million tons (average for 1978-1980: 1,615,000 tons); rice, 93,000 tons (average for 1978-1980: 29,000 tons); peanuts, 180,000 tons (average for 1978-1980: 95,000 tons); bean crop, 430,000 tons (average for 1978-1980: 280,000 tons); cotton, 22,000 tons (average for 1978-1980: 5,000 tons); and sugar cane, 350,000 tons (average 1978-1980: 180,000 tons).

Sixteen projects totaling an investment of 60 billion CFA francs have been planned to carry out the program. After being a traditional way of life rather than an economic activity for a long time, livestock raising is gradually being modernized and is taking on some importance in the economy. Livestock herds were decimated by the drought and had to be rebuilt. Investments in this sector for the 1981-1985 period are estimated at 15 billion CFA francs.

2) Industrial sector: Mining: In 1980, uranium production exceeded 4,000 tons. With the opening up of four new mines, it should exceed 10,000 tons by 1990. Coal from Anou-Araren, which is beginning to be mined, will make it possible to supply the fuel needed for operation of a thermal power plant, which would supply the two mining companies: SOMAIR [Air Region Mining Company] and COMINAK [Akouta Mining Company], as well as the cities of Arlit, Akokan and Agadez.

Projects involving phosphate mining at Tapoa and iron mining at Say depend on the results of studies now being made.

Industrial enterprises: Some 48 industrial enterprises employing nearly 4,000 persons were in activity in 1980. This sector produces food, textiles, leather, chemical products, metal products, and so on, and in 1979, its added value was an estimated 5 billion CFA francs, or 1.2 percent of the GNP.

The limited domestic market, foreign competition, shipping delays which increase the cost of raw materials, equipment and fuel, the absence of industrial tradition and the lack of qualified personnel scarcely tempt investors. Therefore, the government must intervene to finance indispensable industrial projects, including: refrigerated slaughterhouses at Tahoua, Zinder and Maradi; expansion of the Malbaza cement works; farm machinery manufacturing units at Tahoua and Zinder; and a sugar mill at Tillabery (1986).

Energy: Niger is almost entirely dependent on other countries to supply its energy. Coal from Anou-Araren, used as a raw material by the SONICHAR [Nigerien Coal Company] thermal power plant, is a promising beginning. There are plans to develop the power of the plant over the coming decade.

In this field, the major project obviously remains the Kandadji Dam. The total cost of investments will be some 107 billion CFA francs (1980 francs). Some 27 percent of the sum will be spent during the 1980-1985 period, but for the time being, no financing is guaranteed.

3) Infrastructures: Transport: The road system has developed greatly in recent years. Nearly 3,000 kilometers of paved roads constitute major progress and are contributing to a net improvement in communications. Development of the Tillabery-Gabou, Myrriah-Goure and Zinder-Myrriah roads is part of the 24 road infrastructure projects. As for the feasibility study for the Parakou-Niamey railroad, it has just been completed and the study for execution should begin in the months ahead. Finally, the Niamey airport is to be modernized.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Social infrastructure: A major effort in the field of health will be undertaken and 18 billion CFA francs are to be committed for the construction of hospitals, medical centers and clinics. Let us also mention that education and professional training will be particularly developed and for the 1981-1985 period alone, 44 billion CFA francs are to be invested in the sector.

Evaluation of Foreign Aid

Not long ago, taxes on mining activity made it possible to provide the National Investment Fund with major financial resources and foreign aid was only a minor portion of the total sum. Beginning this year, mining activity has contributed only 4 to 5 billion CFA francs in receipts to the government a year and this will be the case until the price of uranium goes up in real terms.

As a result, for 1981-1985, total financing needs of the different sectors of the economy amount to some 590 billion CFA francs. Inasmuch as domestic financial resources will be limited for the period to 48.1 billion francs, it will obviously be necessary to appeal for foreign resources in the form of bank loans and aid, repayable and nonrepayable.

If investments are to be maintained at the 1979-1980 level, a sum of 68 billion CFA francs will have to be allocated for public investments annually, a sum that will have to be requested in the form of foreign aid using a procedure that the Nigerien Government wishes were more flexible.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981

11,464
CSO: 4719/199

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGER

BRIEFS

FRG COOPERATION--The Nigerien-West German Joint Commission met in Maradi from 29 June to 1 July to discuss financial and technical cooperation in 1981 and 1982. The commission looked into several projects in the sphere of hydraulics and agriculture, some of which have already been approved. In 1981 and 1982, the FRG will contribute to the tune of 12 billion CFA francs in the development projects of Niger. This sum represents a 30 percent increase in the FRG's contributions compared to the figure for the previous period. The previous meeting of that commission took place in Bonn in 1979. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul 81 p 1827] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

CSO: 4719/188

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH FRG STRENGTHENED BY DIOUF'S VISIT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul 81 p 1823

[Text] President Abdou Diouf of the Republic of Senegal paid an official visit to the FRG on 2 and 3 July during which he had talks with, among others, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Minister for Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher and President Karl Carstens of the FRG, his host.

This trip was the first state visit to Europe and to a non-African country made by President Diouf since he succeeded former President Leopold Sedar Senghor as Senegal's head of state on 1 January this year. The former Senegalese president made two official visits to the FRG and received the West German president in Dakar.

President Diouf's visit to the FRG was chiefly devoted to political talks. Technical cooperation between the two countries will actually be the subject of a meeting of the German-Senegalese Joint Great Commission scheduled to meet in Bonn from 28 to 30 July.

Political cooperation between these two countries goes back a long way. Bonn and Dakar coordinate their positions in the United Nations Economic and Social Council and in the Commission on Human Rights. Furthermore, the German Social Democratic Party and the Senegalese Socialist Party are members of the Socialist International.

The results of the latest OAU summit meeting, held in Nairobi, were reviewed during the talks, said an official spokesman, and particularly the situation in Chad. The problem of Namibia was also given prominence during these talks, he added, stating that "perfect concordance of views" had been noted on that issue.

The German-Senegalese political talks resulted in new economic initiatives. A development has already taken place when the FRG, which also has very good relations with the Arab world, persuaded Saudi Arabia to increase its aid to the projects to build dams on the Senegal River jointly planned by Senegal, Mali and Mauritania. This initiative has enabled these projects to reach the 85 percent financing level below which some investors did not want the projects to be started but now work is scheduled to begin in 1981. Other spheres of development remain to be explored, such as the mining of iron ore in eastern Senegal, an ore which, according to the experts, has a high iron content and the FRG has paid for the studies conducted on this project.

For the 1980-1982 period, West German financial aid to Senegal will amount to some DM 50 million, while its technical assistance for that same period will be worth DM 15 million. The FRG has contributed 28 percent of the cost of projects sponsored

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

by the European Development Fund in Senegal, it has supplied \$106 million in contributions and funds for studies to finance the dams on the Senegal River and DM 50 million for the financial commitments of the Organization for the Development of the Gambia River involving Gambia, Senegal and Guinea.

So far, the FRG's aid to Senegal totals DM 430 million (\$180 million approximately) and Rainer Offergeld, minister for economic cooperation, told President Diouf that DM 75 million (about \$30 million) have been released from 1981 and 1982. Added to this, Dakar was given DM 41 million (about \$18 million) worth of credits to purchase urgently needed commodities.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.

8796
CSO: 4719/188

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

BRIEFS

ISLAMIC BANK LOANS--On 1 July, the Islamic Development Bank granted a \$15 million loan to Senegal to import sunflower seeds. Due to the fact that this year's crop only produced 200,000 tons of peanuts, compared to 1 million tons in an average year, for the first time ever Senegal must now buy vegetable oil and sunflower seeds to keep its oil mills running. The Islamic Bank has also granted a \$3 million loan to Senegal destined to finance a rural development project in that country. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul 81 p 1823]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

CSO: 4719/188

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TANZANIA

BRIEFS

PREVALENCE OF CORRUPTION--During a parliamentary debate in Dar es Salaam, at the end of June, Tanzanian Minister of Justice Julie Manning and several deputies acknowledged that corruption has become a "chronic disease" in the country. The debate, in which the minister took part, pointed out that the expression "economic sabotage" ('kuhujumu uchumi' in Kiswahili) was inadequate to qualify actions which amount to corruption. The minister noted that in many of these cases it was difficult to obtain definite proof and the investigation of these cases was, therefore, lengthened. She called on public opinion to help in the fight against corruption by making it easier to take legal action against those suspected of being engaged in corruption. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul 81 p 1837] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

INTENSIFICATION OF PETROLEUM EXPLORATION--Al-Noor Kassum, Tanzanian minister for water and energy, told the Dar es Salaam Parliament, on 4 July, that in addition to the oil exploration drilling being done near the Songo-Songo Island, in the south of Tanzania, more drilling will be done in the Mafia Island. The minister announced that two more wells will be sunk in the Songo-Songo Island and that the Algerian company SONATRACH [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons] had been commissioned to do geological surveys north of the Mafia Island. Kassum said that "if offshore drilling produces conclusive results, two other wells will go into operation to determine exactly the reserves available in the Songo-Songo Island." He added that \$26 million in additional appropriations have been earmarked for that project and that Tanzania was negotiating with large oil companies the possibility of doing further explorations in the country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul 81 p 1837] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

AIRPORT PROJECTS--The Tanzanian minister for public works, Samuel Sitta, told the Dar es Salaam Parliament, on 1 July, that a feasibility study on the Makutupora Airport, serving the future Tanzanian capital of Dodoma, was being prepared and that the project will be financed with a French loan. The government, he said, is also seeking funds for the construction of an international airport in Songwe, in the Mbeya region. Work is due to begin this year in the expansion of Dar es Salaam Airport and in the construction of new airports in Singida and Mahengue. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul 81 p 1837] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

CSO: 4719/188

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAIRE

AUTHORITIES TAKE MEASURES TO ELIMINATE COFFEE FRAUD

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1862, 17 Jul 81 p 1893

[Text] Coffee has been the Republic of Zaire's prime agricultural export product for several years. In 1980, official coffee exports amounted to 68,000 tons of Robusta and 6,000 tons of Arabica. In addition, coffee is smuggled out, either to Sudan or to Rwanda. The quantities involved are difficult to evaluate, but they can reasonably be estimated at some 10,000 tons.

In May 1981, the purchase price of coffee to the planter was 4.5 zaires per kilogram in the east, or 6 zaires as it passed over the border. On the parallel market at the same time, the smugglers were offering 11 zaires or \$1 per kilogram -- whichever one chose -- in Isiro and Bunia.

Coffee smuggled out is resold by traffickers at \$2 per kilogram. The difference between the profit obtained for an official export and that obtained for a fraudulent export remains sufficiently high in the northeastern region of the country, which incites smugglers to run the risk, given the distance from the border and the inadequate customs control in these regions.

It should be noted that the smugglers do not pay any taxes on their turnover, no exit duties, no charges, except for transport. In addition, there is the considerable advantage of receiving the money for all sales in foreign exchange. In some cases, however, the coffee is quite simply traded for goods that are then smuggled into Zaire.

In order to reduce this fraud, authorities are contemplating more restrictive measures through the action of the new Customs Office. They are also studying measures that would improve official exports by reducing export costs and by instituting preferential rates on the SNCZ [Zairian National Railroad Company] and ONATRA [National Transportation Office].

Because of the relatively low local consumption -- Zairians prefer tea to coffee -- annual production amounts to some 85,000 tons.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981.

11,464
CSO: 4719/228

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAIRE

BRIEFS

RWANDANS LOSE CITIZENSHIP--Two million Zairians, natives of Rwanda, have lost their citizenship. These immigrants were naturalized en masse by virtue of a law passed in Kinshasa in 1972. However, the law was abrogated on 8 June 1981, forcing the persons involved to apply for Zairian citizenship (after 9 years) on an individual basis. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1073, 29 Jul 81 p 28] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 11,464

CSO: 4719/228

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAMBIA

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK IN OPERATION--The Zambian Agricultural Development Bank (ZADB) started operations in Zambia on 1 July. Created in 1979 by a bill adopted by the parliament in Lusaka and with 75 million Zambian kwachas worth of face capital, the bank should have started operating in 1980. The project had to be delayed for lack of funds. In the 1980 budget, the Zambian state only assigned 6 million kwachas to the ZADB which was to take over the operations of the Agriculture Finance Company (AFC), an agency entrusted with granting loans to farmers. As its name indicates, the role of the ZADB is to promote agricultural development through loans granted to individuals or corporate bodies, to private companies, to cooperatives or to state entities all of which must have the purpose of achieving that goal. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul 81 p 1838] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

CSO: 4719/188

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY